Karen Tucker v. HP Inc by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-17-2017 
Karen Tucker v. HP Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Karen Tucker v. HP Inc" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 460. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/460 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2898 
___________ 
 
KAREN TUCKER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
(HP) HEWLETT PACKARD, INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-04699) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 1, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 17, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Karen Tucker appeals from an order of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing her complaint for failure to comply with 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  We will vacate the District Court’s 
judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
In July 2014, Tucker filed a complaint in the District Court against appellee 
Hewlett-Packard (HP), alleging violations of the New Jersey Products Liability Act, 
consumer protection statutes, fraud statutes, and her due process rights.  Tucker then 
moved to amend her complaint and submitted a proposed amended complaint.  In March 
2015, the District Court found, inter alia, that Tucker’s complaint “is filled with 
redundant, unnecessary, ambiguous, conflicting, irrelevant and confusing allegations, and 
her proposed amendments are overly long and filled with the same.”  Accordingly, the 
District Court gave Tucker leave to amend, warning that failure to comply with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 would result in dismissal of her complaint under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 41.  Dkt. # 23.  In response, Tucker filed a document titled “motion 
for reconsideration.”  HP argued that the document should be treated as an amended 
complaint and requested that it be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8, or 
alternatively that Tucker be required to file another amended complaint.  In October 
2015, the District Court construed Tucker’s document as an amended complaint, 
dismissed it without prejudice under Rule 8, and granted Tucker leave to amend only her 
products liability claim, noting that it could not “decipher any basis” for her other claims.  
See Dkt. # 27 at 4-5.  The District Court again warned her that her complaint would be 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 if she failed to comply with Rule 8.  Id. at 5. 
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In November 2015, Tucker filed another document titled “motion for 
reconsideration.”  Dkt. # 29.  HP again opposed her motion, arguing that she still failed to 
comply with Rule 8.  In May 2016, the District Court treated this document as a second 
amended complaint, concluded that Tucker had failed to comply with Rule 8 as ordered 
and failed to focus on her products liability claim, determined that giving her further 
leave to amend would unduly prejudice HP, and decided that there would be no utility in 
giving her another chance to amend her complaint.  Consequently, the District Court 
dismissed her complaint with prejudice under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with Rule 
8.  Tucker v. Hewlett Packard, Inc., No. 14-4699, 2016 WL 3034106 (D.N.J. May 27, 
2016).  Tucker timely appealed to this Court.1 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  As is familiar, we construe 
pro se filings liberally.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  We 
review a District Court’s dismissal under Rule 8 and under Rule 41(b) for abuse of 
discretion.  See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996) (Rule 8 
dismissals); Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (Rule 41 
dismissals). 
                                              
1 Tucker also filed motions for reconsideration.  Because Tucker did not file a new or 
amended notice of appeal from the District Court’s denial of those motions, we cannot 
review the orders denying those motions.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). 
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Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  A complaint “must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  The allegations in the complaint must not be “so 
undeveloped that [they do] not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is 
contemplated by Rule 8.”  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Under New Jersey products liability law, plaintiffs may plead design defect 
claims, manufacturing defect claims, or inadequate warning defect claims.  See Zaza v. 
Marquess and Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620, 628 (N.J. 1996).  Tucker tried to raise all three 
types of claims under New Jersey law, but she most clearly pleaded a design defect 
claim.  To plead such a claim under New Jersey law, she must have stated that the 
“product was defective, that the defect existed when the product left the defendant’s 
control, and that the defect caused injury to a reasonably foreseeable user.”  Zaza, 675 
A.2d at 627 (quoting Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 479 A.2d 374, 384-85 (N.J. 1984)). 
When the District Court dismissed Tucker’s second amended complaint, it 
“acknowledge[d] that Plaintiff has attempted to organize her allegations into a more 
coherent manner, including numbered paragraphs. . . .” Tucker, 2016 WL 3034106, at *2.  
Reading Tucker’s complaint liberally, several paragraphs qualify as a “short and plain 
statement of [her] claim” under Rule 8, and provide HP notice as to what type of claim 
she is asserting.  For instance, in one paragraph, she stated that on March 6, 2014, she 
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“was using the Hewlett Packard . . . Pavilion dv7-4071nr Entertainment Notebook Serial 
# CNF020520N . . . keyboard” to type, that the computer was “powered by HP brand 
defective AC adapter, battery and cord Serial #213349,” which “spontaneously 
excessively overheated and emitted electric shocks causing Plaintiff to sustain painful 
electric shocks, second and third degree thermal burns to both hands, . . . emotional 
distress, and mental anguish[.] ”  Dkt. # 29 at 7-8, ¶ 7.  In another paragraph, Tucker 
contended that HP recalled the power cord for her computer model because it was found 
to be defective.  Dkt. # 29 at 11-12, ¶ 18.  Finally, she stated:  “Defendant(s) was the 
manufacturer or seller of HP Pavilion dv7-407nr Entertainment Notebook . . . and 
defective cord products[,]” and “that the product causing the harm and personal injury 
was defective and dangerous” because it had a manufacturing defect, failed to adequately 
warn the user, and was defectively designed.  Dkt. # 29 at 13, ¶ 21.  We agree with the 
District Court that Tucker’s pleadings are unnecessarily long and contain extraneous 
material.  But, at bottom, Tucker alleged that her computer’s power cord was defective, 
that the defect existed when the cord left HP’s control, and that the defect caused injury 
to a reasonably foreseeable user - her.  See Zaza, 675 A.2d at 627.  This is sufficient for 
Rule 8 purposes.  See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94.2  
                                              
2 When using a dismissal as a sanction, a District Court is ordinarily required to consider 
and balance six factors enumerated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 
863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).  The District Court here did not cite Poulis or fully consider its 
factors.  See Livera v. First Nat. State Bank of N.J., 879 F.2d 1186, 1188 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(concluding that District Court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the Poulis 
factors).  We need not conduct a Poulis analysis here, however, in light of our conclusion 
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Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for further 
proceedings on Tucker’s products liability claim.3  We express no opinion on the merits 
of her claim, and our opinion does not preclude the defendant from raising any 
affirmative defenses that may be available. 
                                                                                                                                                  
that Tucker's amended complaints did, in fact, comply with Rule 8. 
 
3 While we conclude that Tucker’s design defect allegations are sufficient for Rule 8 
purposes, we express no opinion as to whether she has pleaded or can plead 
manufacturing defect or inadequate warning defect claims. 
